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Abstract
As oil and gas are exhaustible resources, the need for economic diversification has gained
momentum in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries immediately after the end of
the first oil boom in 1973-74. Economic diversification, in the context of GCC countries,
implies development of the non-oil sector and reduction of the proportion of government
revenue and export proceeds from the oil and gas sector. Applying newly developed mea-
sures of business cycle synchronicity between oil and non-oil sectors in three GCC economies
(Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia), we show both the degree of diversification achieved so
far and the direction of diversification in terms of individual non-oil sectors. Overall, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia appear to be moderately ahead than Qatar in reducing their dependence
on oil. Nevertheless, by developing large production capacities of natural gas, Qatar has
recently reduced its dependence on oil in favor of natural gas. A quantitative assessment of
the determinants of business cycle synchronization is also provided.
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1 Introduction
The symptoms of a typical oil-dependent economy are well known. High volatility and unpre-
dictability of oil prices can significantly impact major components of national income accounting.
Output, investment, government spending and exports all move in tandem with the oil price,
thereby making the economy highly vulnerable to oil price volatility. The six countries of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United
Arab Emirates (UAE) – are a typical case of such symptoms of an oil-dependent economy. Be-
tween 1970 and 1980 when oil prices rose sharply over an extended period, the GCC economies
recorded impressive growth. However, once oil prices collapsed during most part of late 1980s
and in 1990s, the overall GCC economies suffered terribly.1 As oil prices started to increase
gradually at the beginning of this decade, the GCC economic story changed once again. Strong
positive real growth, fiscal and current account surpluses (along with higher inflation) became
the economic stigma of the GCC states.2 See Table 1 for some stylized facts about the GCC
economies.
Table 1: The role of oil in GCC countries’ government revenues, exports and GDP: 1980 and
2007 (percent)
Government revenues Exports GDP
1980 2007 1980 2007 1980 2007
Bahrain 77.0 80.0 33.6 79.2 28.0 24.6
Kuwait 82.0 93.1 90.0 94.4 59.7 53.2
Oman 86.0 76.4 92.4 75.8 59.3 45.1
Qatar 94.0 60.0 95.0 80.8 64.0 56.4
Saudi Arabia 91.2 82.5 99.9 88.0 65.8 50.9
UAE 96.0 77.0 94.0 38.5 57.0 11.1
Source: ESCWA (2001); national authorities. UAE figures are preliminary.
Indeed, such volatility in economic activity such as government spending is costly for the
overall economy, and efforts to smooth-out economic swings became a dominant policy agenda
of the GCC economies.3 Since oil and gas are exhaustible resources, the incentive to smooth-
out economic cycles by means of economic diversification began soon after the first oil boom
(1973-74).4 Economic diversification, in the context of the GCC economies, simply means the
1See ESCWA (2001) for an accounting of economic performance of GCC economies from 1970-1999.
2See Sturm et al. (2008) for an overview of recent economic performance in GCC countries.
3See Barnett and Ossowski (2002) and the references therein for an assessment on the macroeconomic costs
of fiscal volatility in oil-producing countries.
4See ESCWA (2001), Fasano and Iqbal (2003), Malaeb (2006) and Sturm et al. (2008) on economic diversifi-
cation in the GCC countries.
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development of the non-oil sectors and the reduction of the proportion of government revenue
and export proceeds from oil and gas sector. As the oil and gas sector offers limited employ-
ment opportunities given that it is very capital intensive, the need for diversification is especially
pressing in GCC countries due to their high population growth and a rising a pool of young un-
employed workers.5 Until recently, public sector has been absorbing a large part of unemployed
nationals in every GCC states. For instance, in Kuwait over 90% of nationals are employed in
the public sector. However, there is a limit to job creation in the public sector, let alone its
sustainability. Therefore, the development of the non-oil sector was considered vital not only
for easing labor market pressure but also for reducing the exposure of economic development
to volatile international oil market (Sturm et al., 2008).6
The objective of this paper is to empirically analyze the degree of diversification achieved
so far among the six Gulf countries. The question of economic diversification in the context of
GCC countries, that is the decoupling of non-oil sector from the oil sector,7 is tantamount of
asking the question whether emerging markets have decoupled from the advance economies.8
That is, one can utilize the cross-country approach that is used to analyze global business cycles
convergence or divergence to answer a local question: “has the non-oil sector decoupled from
the oil sector in an oil-dependent economy?” Taking GCC countries as a case study, in this
paper we provide a quantitative answer to the above question.9 In this paper, the degree of
decoupling is used as an indicator of economic diversification achieved in the GCC countries. In
doing so, we have analyzed the degree of business cycle synchronicity between the oil sector and
the non-oil sectors in the GCC economies. Defining business cycles as output gaps, we measure
cycle synchronicity using the recently proposed nonparametric method of Mink, Jacobs and de
Haan (2007).
Several interesting results emerge from the analysis. Overall, the non-oil sectors in Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia appears to be moderately ahead than Qatar in reducing their dependency
5Almost one third of the overall GCC population is below the age of 15. Save for Kuwait and Qatar, unem-
ployment among nationals is comparatively high in Bahrain (17 percent), Oman (16 percent) and Saudi Arabia
(14 percent). In the UAE, unemployment among university graduates is as high as 60 percent! See, among
others, Shochat (2008) for a recent account on the labor market condition in GCC countries.
6Nevertheless, the pressure to diversify varied across GCC countries in line with the differences in energy
reserves. Bahrain has advanced itself as the most diversified economy in GCC as oil and gas reserves (at current
production levels) are projected to run out during the next two decades. See Sturm and Siegfried (2005) for an
analysis of projected depletion of hydrocarbon reserves in GCC countries.
7Unless stated otherwise, by oil sector we imply the hydrocarbon (oil and gas) sector. In this paper, we use
“oil and gas” and “oil” interchangeably.
8Some recent studies analyzing the decoupling between advanced and emerging countries are Mink et al.
(2007), Kose et al. (2008) and Wa¨lti (2009).
9Due to data limitation, only Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are considered in the analysis.
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on oil sectors. However, aggressive and large expansion of Qatar’s natural gas production
has helped the country to reduce its dependence on oil in support of natural gas, which in
turn partially shield the economy from unfavorable fluctuations in international oil prices. At
the sectoral level, while Qatar’s manufacturing sector shows some meaningful decoupling from
the oil sector, the rest of non-oil sectors remain heavily dependent on oil cycle. In Saudi
Arabia the financial service sector stands as least dependent on oil, while its manufacturing
sector continues to depend on oil. By comparison, investment income from Kuwait’s large
foreign assets has helped the country to avoid slowdown in key non-oil sectors during times of
weaker oil prices. Finally, fiscal stance variable and oil price significantly explain the business
cycle synchronization between oil and non-oil sectors in Saudi Arabia, whereas results are less
supportive for Kuwait and Qatar.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants of business
cycle synchronization in the context of GCC countries. Section 3 describes the estimation
methodology and data. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. A quantitative assessment
of the determinants of business cycle synchronization is offered in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Determinants of Business Cycle Synchronization
Unlike cross-country studies, where external shocks such as trade and financial integration play
a large role in business cycle synchronization across countries, the within-country determinants
of business cycle synchronization are quite the opposite. In this section, we review some possible
channels through which shocks can transmit from oil to non-oil sectors in typical oil dependent
economies.
2.1 Government Spending
Public spending is the lifeblood of non-oil sector in the GCC countries. Although GCC
economies are heavily dominated by oil and gas, there is no direct link between the oil and
non-oil sectors. As oil and gas industries are primarily publicly owned10 and revenues from
their extraction accrue to the government, the non-oil sector receives its share of oil revenue
mainly through fiscal budgets. Thus, upon receiving the oil revenue, government has a choice
10The gross share of the government oil company in crude oil production in 2006 was estimated at 100% in
Qatar, 97% in Saudi Arabia and 90% in Kuwait (Sturm et al., 2008).
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between saving the oil revenue in order to accumulate financial assets and/or invest in domes-
tic physical assets (in the form of capital expenditure). History shows that GCC authorities
have fulfilled both purposes. Like other oil exporting countries, GCC authorities have set up
oil stabilization and savings funds, often referred to as the sovereign wealth funds (SWFs),11
with the aim of, apart from investment return motive, making fiscal policy less volatile and less
procyclical by de-linking public spending from oil revenues. On the other hand, investment in
physical and social infrastructure (e.g., education, health) is generally regarded as being con-
ducive to diversifying the economy away from hydrocarbons, developing the non-oil sector and
also creating a basis for generating tax revenues (Sturm et al., 2009).
In the (almost) absence of taxation, oil revenue serves as the pivotal element of fiscal policy
in GCC countries. However, given the volatility and unpredictability of oil prices,12 public
authorities’ in GCC countries have very little control over the level of oil revenues. The volatility
of oil prices, and hence government revenues, tends to contribute to a procyclical pattern of
government expenditure, and to abrupt changes in government spending, which in turn affect
the growth prospects of the non-oil sector. Historically, procyclicality has been a feature of fiscal
policy in much of the oil-exporting countries. Studying the fiscal policies in 19 oil-exporting
countries over the period 1965-2005, Sturm et al. (2009) find support of procyclical conduct of
fiscal policy, including a more pronounced response during 1985-2005 sub-period.
There is little disagreement among economists that, as a rule, fiscal policy should not be
procyclical. However, in the context of GCC countries, procyclical fiscal policies are sometimes
warranted for several reasons. First, there is a distribution-related concern in which citizens
and private businesses may think that it is fair to benefit from windfall oil revenue in the form
of higher public spending. Indeed, there is a spending pressure on government during good
times that may lead to higher subsidies, more public sector employment, higher public wages
etc., while local businesses benefit from lucrative government contracts.13 Since this kind of
implicit social contract between nationals and government ensured that everybody gained from
the newly acquired fortunes, higher public spending receive broad popular support.14
11Kuwait’s fund, perhaps the oldest in the world, created in 1953, while the Abu Dhabi’s fund, created in 1976,
is believed to be the largest in the world (Beck and Fidora, 2008).
12According to Cashin, Liang and McDermott (1999), there is a one-in-three change of a monthly oil price
change greater than 8 percent. The average annual oil price change during 1970-2005 was 27 percent.
13For example, in Kuwait over 90% of nationals are employed in the public sector. A recent distribution
related expenditure in GCC countries is the widespread public sector wage increase, which in part was granted
in response to rising inflation. See Sturm et al. (2008) on recent wage developments in GCC countries.
14Even if there is limited public pressure for higher spending, the incentives for fiscal prudence are low since
budgetary competition increases in good times, spending grows more than proportionally relative to the increase
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Second, demand for higher public spending may also arise due to development-related spend-
ing needs such as spending on infrastructure, education and health. Unlike, distribution-driven
expenditure, these areas are generally considered vital to economic development, private invest-
ment, and in particular, economic diversification. Indeed, part of oil proceeds has been used to
modernize infrastructure and improve social indicators. During 1980-2000, the six GCC states
had increased literacy rates by 20 percentage points to over 80%, added almost 10 years of
average life expectancy to about 74 years and created a world-class infrastructure by spending
a total of $2 trillion.15 While such efforts should be given their dues, in practice it might be
difficult to disentangle these expenditures from primary distribution-related considerations.16
Third, limited borrowing access to international financial markets during economic down-
turns provides another important explanation as to why discretionary policy is not countercycli-
cal during recessions. After the collapse of oil price in early 1980s, the level of Saudi Arabia’s
public deficit was second only to that of the United States. As a result, Saudi Arabia was
forced to postpone its March 1986 budget for the fiscal year 1986-87 (Ramazani, pp. 103-04,
1988). Similar financial retrenchment was also evident in other GCC countries. Kuwait’s 1986-
87 budget projected a real deficit, first time in its modern history, although Kuwait’s substantial
reserves were believed to be sufficient to absorb the deficit quite easily. Whereas lacking the
cushioning effects of financial reserves, Qatar underwent a persistent fiscal deficits over 1986-
1999 period (barring 1990). Although a deeper examination of the causes of budget deficits in
GCC countries is an interesting topic for further research, but nevertheless we dare to speculate
that restricted borrowing ability in bad times may have been a factor behind fiscal consolidation
in downturns.
Another explanation of procyclicality stems from the presumption that it is often difficult for
policymakers to accurately gauge the stage of the cycle (Balassone and Kumar, 2007). Proper
assessment of the output gap and the economy’s momentum can be problematic due to the
difficulties in estimating the underlying or potential growth of the economy. Moreover, there
may be substantial lags in the availability of data. Therefore, even if the government has the
means to engage in countercyclical policy in the sense of delineating, ex ante, the turning points
in the non-oil sector, it may ends up not doing so because of an unreliable assessment of the
in revenue (Lane and Tornell, 1999).
15Fasano and Iqbal (2003) and David (2009).
16For example, as argued by Sturm et al. (2009), calls for higher salaries for teachers may be well justified to
increase the quality of education, but it also includes a distribution component. Likewise, political pressures may
lead to stimulative infrastructure development regardless of the economic environment.
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economic cycle. Finally, pressure for increased public spending may stem from international
community in the context of the debate on global imbalances. For example, the IMF explic-
itly acknowledges GCC’s fiscal role in removing the bottlenecks in global economic activities.
According to Dominique Strauss-Kahn, IMF’s Managing Director: “The GCC countries are
playing an important stabilizing role in the global oil and financial markets. Large investment
projects aim to expand oil production and refining capacity, and strong import growth supports
the international efforts to reduce global imbalances.”17
In sum, due to the strong fiscal dominance in GCC countries, fiscal policy tends to be the
main channel for propagating external shocks associated with oil price fluctuations into the
non-oil economy. In Section 5, we empirically examine the role of fiscal stance in explaining the
cycle synchronization between oil and non-oil sectors.
2.2 Oil Prices
Generally speaking, changes in oil prices may not have any independent impact on the non-
oil sector. Oil revenue is unlikely to influence non-oil output growth unless it is channeled
through government’s fiscal instruments. Indeed, in a panel regression of 10 oil-producing
countries, Husain et al. (2008) find that oil prices do not independently influence the underlying
non-oil output. Nevertheless, as argued above, rising oil prices may put political pressure on
government’s fiscal stance in that the public (or interest groups) may demand their share of
windfall revenues in the form of higher public spending. In addition, (favorable) change in
oil price can operate via expectations and the overall business sentiment in the non-oil sector.
Thus, the impact of oil price on non-oil economic cycle may emerge from its effect on fiscal
policy. To allow for this possibility, we therefore use an interaction term between oil price and
government spending when analyzing the determinants of cycle synchronization.
3 Estimation Methodology
We use output gap as a measure of business cycle, which looks at the deviation of economic
activity from a trend. Several filtering methods are available that can be used to decompose
an economic activity such as output into trend and cycle. Perhaps the most widely used
technique is the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter, a nonparametric filter that estimates the
17IMF Press Release No. 08/210, September 17, 2008. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08210.htm
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trend component by minimizing deviations from trend, subject to a predetermined smoothness
of the resulting trend.18 Once the output gap is estimated, the next step is to determine to
what extent these cycles move together. Recently, Mink et al. (2007) propose a nonparametric
measure of cycle synchronicity that has several advantages over the conventional output gap
correlation measure.19 For example, whereas the output gap correlation yields averages over
a time interval, the Mink et al. (2007) measure can be calculated on a per-observation basis,
which is extremely valuable in understanding the direction of business cycle synchronization.
Moreover, this new measure is easy to interpret and can be applied bilaterally (between two
sectors) or multilaterally (between a group of sectors). The idea behind the synchronicity
measure is to determine to what extent an individual cycle moves together with respect to
a reference cycle. Unlike cross-country analysis where the choice of a reference cycle is not
straightforward,20 in the present application the choice is clear: the oil cycle is chosen as the
reference cycle.
Denoting the reference output gap for a country by gr(t), the synchronicity between an
individual sector i and the reference cycle in period t, as proposed by Mink et al. (2007), is
given by:
ϕir(t) =
gi(t)gr(t)
|gi(t)gr(t)| , (1)
where gi(t) stands for the output gap of sector i in period t (see Table 2 for a list of economic
sectors considered in the analysis). We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the time-
varying trend from the original data. Following the suggestion of Ravn and Uhlig (2002) we use
a penalty parameter of 6.25 for annual data. All output gaps are expressed as the difference
between actual GDP and trend GDP, divided by the trend GDP.
18Scott (2000) and De Haan et al. (2008) show that different alternatives to measure output gap do not lead
to significant divergences in results. Applying a battery of statistics (including the Hodrick-Prescott filter) to
measure the oil and non-oil output gaps across the six GCC countries, Osman et al. (2008) find that estimates of
the output gaps variables obtained from different methodologies are not only broadly consistent, they also show
strong comovement with each other.
19With the conventional correlation measure, it is not clear whether to consider correlations in log levels or
correlations in rates of growth. For example, the correlation between the log levels of Saudi Arabia’s oil and
manufacturing sector is 0.48 over the period 1968-2008, whereas the correlation between their growth rates is 0.03.
Moreover, correlation coefficients mix two characteristics of the business cycle: synchronicity and amplitude. See
Figure 1 in Mink et al. (2007) for a visual illustration of this point.
20For instance, studies that examine synchronization of business cycle in the euro area often face difficulty in
choosing a “European business cycle”: should it coincide either with the cycle of a leading European economy,
or the cycle of a weighted average of several European economies, or the cycle of a common factor. Recognizing
this difficulty, Camacho et al. (2006) consider a pairwise comparison of cycles, while Mink et al. (2007) set the
reference cycle as the median of all observed output gaps.
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When gi(t) and gr(t) in equation (1) have the same sign, the synchronicity equals 1 while it
equals -1 when their signs are opposite; ϕir(t) lies between -1 and 1. In this context, decoupling
(or diversification) is easily defined. Thus, when the synchronicity measure converges to -1,
that is when both output gaps do not coincide at all, sector i is said to be decoupled from the
reference (oil) sector. Likewise, sector i is said to be dependent on the reference sector when
the synchronicity measure approaches to 1. When transformed to a uniform [0,1] scale, the
synchronicity measure indicates the fraction of times sector i’s output gaps has the same sign
as the reference cycle in period t.
Finally, a multivariate version of equation (1) which can be used to examine the synchronicity
of business cycles between the reference cycle and a group of n sectors in period t, is also available
from Mink et al. (2007):
ϕ(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
gi(t)gr(t)
|gi(t)gr(t)| , (2)
where N is the number of non-oil sectors within a country. Since the aggregate non-oil sec-
tor is defined as the sum of individual non-oil sector i, equation (2) is used to examine the
synchronicity of business cycle between the oil (reference) and aggregate non-oil sector.
3.1 Data
Data on gross domestic product by sectors at constant prices and fiscal variables for each country
in our sample are taken from the respective national sources. These data series are available
at the annual frequency and sample size varies for each country. The dataset comprises three
GCC countries: Kuwait (1978-2007), Qatar (1980-2006) and Saudi Arabia (1968-2008); long-
span data for the remaining three GCC countries could not be obtained. Kuwait’s data are
extracted from various issues of the Quarterly Statistical Bulletin published by the Central
Bank of Kuwait. Much of Qatar’s data are retrieved from the Annual Statistical Abstract
CDROM 1981-2005 published by the Planning Council; the remaining data were updated from
Government’s official websites. The data for Saudi Arabia come from Saudi Arabian Monetary
Agency (SAMA) website. In fact, the entire macroeconomic data for Saudi Arabia come as a
Statistical Appendix of SAMA’s forty-fifth annual report. Finally, the oil price (discussed in
section 5) is taken from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED economic database. The oil
price is the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) spot price traded on the NYMEX.
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4 Empirical Results
Figures 1 to 3 present the synchronicity between individual countries non-oil business cycle
and oil (reference) cycle. As the synchronicity measure fluctuates over time, following Wa¨lti
(2009) we also report the corresponding long-run trend extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter. In addition, where applicable, the Figures are marked with important events such as
first oil crisis (1973-74), second oil crisis (1979-81), the Gulf war (1990-91) and the recent oil
price shock (2005-2008); during all these episodes oil prices significantly increased. The overall
impression is indeed that synchronicity is highly volatile and differs across countries. The long-
run trend of synchronicity measure for Kuwait indicates that non-oil sector’s dependence on
the oil sector has steadily increased over time, suggesting decreasing economic diversification.
By comparison, after increasing until mid-1980, the long-run trend of synchronicity for Qatar
had been declining, albeit at a very slow pace. Although it would be hasty to consider this as
an evidence of meaningful economic diversification, it is nevertheless interesting to speculate.
Finally for Saudi Arabia, the long-run synchronicity trend increased modestly until mid-1990
and declined thereafter. The reported non-oil synchronicity as shown in Figures 1–3 become
easier to interpret when we transform them to a uniform [0,1] scale. For example, the value for
synchronicity in non-oil sectors in Qatar indicates that on average 100%× (0.0639+1)/2 = 53%
of times the non-oil sector had an output gap with the same sign as the output gap of the oil
sector.21 The comparable figures for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, respectively, are 45% and 46%.
Therefore, if decoupling is defined as to how many times the reference and individual output
gaps coincide with each other (or have the same sign or not), the non-oil sector in both Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia exhibit almost similar extent of diversification from the oil sector. Whereas,
Qatar’s non-oil sector shows a slightly higher degree of dependence on the oil-sector relative to
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.22
Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with caution. Unlike Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia, where oil production remains the significant contributing part of their hydrocarbon
production, recently in Qatar the share of natural gas contribution to hydrocarbon output has
21The value 0.0639 is the average value of the synchronicity measure, as defined in equation (1), of all non-oil
sectors in Qatar.
22It is not very surprising to notice the slight difference in results as reported by the long-run trend and the
time average of synchronicity measures. This is likely due to the end-of-sample uncertainty in the estimation of
trends and gaps. Trends (and gaps) require both past and future data, that is why it is much difficult to estimate
their values at the beginning of the sample (where there is no past data) and at the end of the sample (where
there is no future data) – see Watson (2007) for further discussion.
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exceeded than that of crude oil. The Qatari authorities have invested heavily in natural gas
projects over successive years, and it holds the world’s third largest natural gas reserves after
Russia and Iran. Qatar is currently the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG).23
Whilst the switch from oil to gas has not eliminated Qatar’s dependency on commodity exports,
however compared to spot prices of oil, natural gas prices tend to be less volatile, and generally
gas exports are arranged on the basis of long-term sales and purchase agreement.24 Indeed, the
significant boost in gas production has helped Qatar to avoid the current global economic crisis
and registered strong overall and non-oil GDP growth during 2008-2009 (IMF, 2009). Thus,
Qatar is well positioned to survive turbulent economic times than other GCC countries.
It is also useful to look at synchronicity at the sectoral level to gauge the direction of
non-oil diversification in term of its components. Figures 4 to 6 show the year-by-year binary
synchronicity indicator respectively for Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. As above, the concor-
dance measures are presented along with their long-run trends. Roughly, the agriculture and
manufacturing sectors can be classified as a tradable sector, while the rest of the sectors can be
treated as a nontradable (or service) sector.
The GCC countries do not have a suitable climatic conditions for agriculture. Scarcity of
natural water supply, limited arable land and the harsh climatic conditions severely constrain the
development of agriculture to become a viable sector. Moreover, the agricultural sector depends
almost entirely on imported labor. With these constraints and the cost of heavy subsidies of
the factors of production (e.g. cost of desalination of water), some efforts have been made,
particularly in Oman and Saudi Arabia, to exploit their limited agricultural potential. For
example, the contribution of the agricultural sector (including fishery and forestry) to nominal
GDP has nearly doubled in Saudi Arabia, but remained insignificant in Kuwait and Qatar.
Figure 4 shows that the synchronization between Kuwait’s agriculture and oil output gaps has
increased over the years, reflecting a very high degree of oil dependency. Qatar’s agriculture
dependence on the oil sector has primarily been cyclical. Particularly in the previous ten years
(1997-2006), only in three occasions has Qatar’s agriculture output gap coincided with the oil
output gap. Two of these occurrences took place during 2004–2006, which partly explain the
recent rise in the long-run trend of agriculture output. Nevertheless, the lack of coincidence
of outputs gaps in the recent decade does not necessarily mean that Qatar’s agriculture has
23See IIF (2008) for related discussion.
24See QNB (2009, p. 18) for a list of Qatar’s contracted LNG exports.
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achieved some degree of independence, rather it reflects the limited agricultural potential due
to the harsh climatic conditions. The rise and fall in Saudi Arabia’s agricultural synchronicity
with the oil cycle is perhaps consistent with the Kingdom’s uneconomical wheat bonanza of
the 1980s which made the country a wheat net exporter. However, the cost of rising subsidy
and above all the relatively high amount of water requirement had compelled the Kingdom to
lower its wheat production that resulted in the overall reduction of its agriculture production
starting 1995. Since then the total agriculture production in Saudi Arabia has largely remained
stagnant at the 1995 level.
Food security is as much important for GCC countries as it is for economically poorer
countries. Rapid food price escalation in 2007 and the first part of 2008 has brought back
the issue of food security to the center stage of GCC policymaking. High volatility in global
food prices and a combination of domestic factors (such as rapidly rising local population
and increasing cost of domestic agricultural production) have prompted GCC government and
private investors to move ahead with investments in agriculture overseas–notably in Africa and
Central Asia–to ensure future food security.25
Given the region’s abundant supplies of natural gas and hydrocarbon by-products, the de-
velopment of heavy manufacturing industry in the GCC countries has primarily concentrated
on petrochemicals, chemical fertilizers, steel and aluminium. Qatar was an early pioneer of the
establishment of capital- and energy-intensive heavy industries in the GCC region, followed by
Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait (ESCWA, 2001). Aggressive investment and large capacity ad-
dition to the various petrochemical plants have made Saudi Arabia one of the largest producers
of petrochemicals in the world (SABIC, 2005). Industrial development in the GCC also bene-
fitted from a fairly well diversified base of medium- and small-scale manufacturing industries,
which are developed with the aim of substituting imports in domestic markets as well as other
Arab export markets.26 Overall, the development of heavy industry provided a major boost to
the total value of output and exports of the GCC countries outside the oil sector. For example,
from 1980 to 2005, the gross value-added at 1990 constant prices in the manufacturing industry
increased 84 percent in Kuwait, 265 percent in Qatar and 292 percent in Saudi Arabia. The
GCC group average value-added rose from US$ 9.50 billion in 1980 to US$40 billion in 2005,
25See Woertz et al. (2008) for an assessment of the potential of GCC agricultural investment in countries of
Africa and Central Asia. Recently, Qatar has launched a national food security program to ensure long-term
food security in the country.
26These industries include cement, building materials and equipment, heavy and light metal products, electrical
products, textiles, clothing and accessories, food, furniture, household items and a wide variety of other products.
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in real terms.27 As a result, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP, exports,
and employment increased in all GCC member countries. Nevertheless, like oil, petrochemical
products – which account for nearly half of the total value of manufacturing output in Kuwait,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia – face routine upswings and downswings in world demand and prices.
Furthermore, higher European Union tariffs on GCC’s exports of aluminium and petrochemical
products have been preventing the GCC manufacturing export sector to access the European
market (Chirullo and Guerrieri, 2002).
During the 1990s, Kuwait’s manufacturing sector heavily depended on the oil sector, which
may be due to the Gulf war. Whilst in recent years the synchronization measure appears
to have fallen (see Figure 4), the reality is that since the start of 2000s Kuwait’s oil output
has picked up much rapidly than its manufacturing output. As a result, the contribution of
the manufacturing sector to its overall GDP has fallen to the 1980s level.28 Thus the decline
in Kuwait’s long-run trend of synchronicity is a statistical artifact and does not correspond to
actual diversification. In contrast, Qatar’s seems to have advanced in manufacturing by reducing
its dependence on the oil sector (see Figure 5). The long-run trend of synchronicity is clearly
declining, which is also supported by a rise in the manufacturing contribution to non-oil GDP.
Despite the unprecedented rise in Qatar’s oil output since 2000, the post-2000 manufacturing
contribution to overall GDP remained broadly similar to the pre-2000 level. Among the three
GCC countries, Saudi Arabia has developed itself as the region’s backbone in manufacturing.
In the recent decade, the manufacturing contribution to the overall GDP has remained constant
at around 10%, while its share to the non-oil GDP has steadily risen. Nevertheless, much of
Saudi’s comparative advantage in manufacturing lies in the hydrocarbon sector, as is evident
from the frequent coincidence of positive output gaps (see Figure 6).
Turning to the remaining non-oil sectors, GCC’s nontradable service sector is dominated
by financial service, tourism and construction activities. Development in one sector is likely
to influence activities in other sectors. For example, development in financial and construc-
tion sectors can spur activities in the tourism sectors in terms of greater volume of visitors
from neighboring countries involving transactions in financial assets (e.g. offshore banking) or
physical assets (e.g. real estate purchase). Over the years, both Bahrain and the UAE have
27Source: author’s calculations based on United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD) Database, National ac-
counts estimates of main aggregates (http://data.un.org/).
28Kuwait’s manufacturing sector contribution to non-oil GDP has also declined since 2000, albeit by a lesser
magnitude.
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transformed themselves into financial and tourism hubs, whereas despite being a late starter,
Qatar is rapidly leapfrogging into tourism and finance. Despite being an early pioneer in the
establishment of stock exchange in 1977 (much earlier than other official exchanges in the GCC),
Kuwait’s financial sector has not emerged as a preferred or dominant financial center to compete
with Bahrain or the UAE. Nevertheless, Kuwait has a relatively developed derivative market
and an active local bond market, but tourism is almost nonexistent in Kuwait. By comparison,
Saudi Arabia is a special case with millions of visitors annually visit the Kingdom for the pur-
pose of Hajj or Umrah, a gathering of religious pilgrimage. The Kingdom has lately begun to
promote finance with the planned establishment of the King Abdullah Financial District.
In the interests of brevity, we present the average of the synchronization measure by sector
for each country in Table 2. These values indicate the fraction of time the oil and non-oil sectors’
output gaps have the same signs (both positive or both negative). Higher values signal greater
dependence on oil, and vice versa. The numbers speak for themselves. Saudi’s financial sector
is the least dependent on oil, which is a reflection of the Kingdom’s comprehensive banking
services in terms of greater competition and lower concentration than Kuwait and Qatar.29
The financial sector in Kuwait and Qatar remains dependent on oil during the recent oil boom,
while the dependence was relatively lower in Saudi Arabia.
The estimates of synchronicity for Qatar’s construction sector appear to be imprecise par-
ticularly in the recent years. Figure 5 shows that between 2000 and 2005 Qatar’s construction
output decoupled from the oil cycle, when in fact budgetary allocation for capital expenditures
during these periods persistently increased on the back of rising oil export revenues.30 The
evidence for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is roughly comparable and is supported by the time
average statistic reported in Table 2. On the other hand, the real estate (an associated sector of
construction) is highly reliant on oil in Kuwait than Saudi Arabia. The single most important
factor that makes the Saudi real estate market different from other markets is the lack of home
ownership. This is partly because of sizeable financial and legal barriers to home ownership in
Saudi Arabia, with home ownership currently estimated at only 30% of the population. Kuwait
by contrast spends more than twice as much on subsidies and transfers as Saudi Arabia and
other GCC countries to support basic amenities such as health care, education and housing
to its nationals. For example, in the post Iraqi invasion years, the Kuwaiti government bailed
29See Salem-Ghanem et al. (2002) and Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) for further discussion.
30Capital expenditure on goods and services includes spending on infrastructure, communications and others.
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out all consumer and housing loans of Kuwaiti national outstanding at the time of the invasion
(Fennell, 1997). These features are clearly evident in Figure 4.
Table 2: Time average of synchronicity measure between oil and non-oil sectors (percent)
Economic sectors Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia
(1978-2007) (1980-2006) (1968-2008)
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 53 37 49
Manufacturing 50 48 63
Finance & insurance 47 63 22
Real estate 63 – 41
Construction 43 41 44
Wholesale, retail trading & hotels 37 56 39
Transport & communication 47 59 51
Government services – 59 49
Social & personal services 43 63 27
Non-oil GDP 45 53 46
Note: Values indicate the fraction of time oil and non-oil sectors have coinciding output
gaps (both positive or both negative). Thus a higher (lower) value signals higher (lower)
dependence on the oil sector. The non-oil GDP is defined as the sum of all above listed
sectors plus utilities (electricity, gas & water) less imputed bank service charge. ‘–’
indicates not available.
In other areas (trading, transportation, government and social services), Qatar relies more
heavily on oil than both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia – see Table 2. The case of Kuwait, however,
is quite compelling. During the period 1985-1993 the social service sector seems completely
decoupled from the oil sector (save for the Iraqi invasion period of August 1990 to February
1991). Oil price remained low during the entire period 1985-1993. In response, the Kuwaiti
government pursued more conservative fiscal policies by restraining high development spending
budgeted in earlier years. As a result, Kuwait was able to continue increasing its holding
of official assets despite the weaker oil prices (Fennell, 1997). Indeed, investment income from
Kuwait’s huge foreign assets amounted to 86 percent of oil export receipts in 1989, while budget
surplus was close to 30 percent of GDP in the same year (El-Erian, 1997). These developments
had helped the government to finance its generous subsidy and transfer programs for nationals
amidst the unfavorable international oil prices.
5 Can Cycle Synchronicity be Explained?
The preceding analysis shows that some sectors are more cyclically synchronized with the oil
sector than others. However, as economists, we might want to understand what is behind those
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synchronization. Are there any economic variables that can help to explain the synchronization
of the cycles? In Section 2 we discussed potential factors such as government spending and
change in oil prices that might explain the synchronization. Our goal in this section is to provide
an empirical assessment of these potential factors in explaining the cycle synchronization across
sectors within a country.
Recall the synchronicity measure, ϕir(t), which can easily be turned into a binary variable
such that:
ϕir(t) =
 1 when individual and reference output gaps have the same sign,0 when their signs are opposite.
The binary nature of ϕir(t) naturally suggests a panel logit (or probit) specification which
relates the binary dependent variable to a set of explanatory variables:
Pr{ϕir(t) = 1|xir(t), β, αi) = Λ(αi + x′ir(t)β}, (3)
where i = 1, ..., N and N is the number of non-oil economic sectors in a country; t = 1, ...T is
the time dimension; αi are random individual-specific effects, Λ(·) is the cumulative distribution
of the standard normal distribution and the matrix xir(t) contains explanatory variables in a
given year t. For estimation purpose, we rewrite (3) as follows:
ϕir(t) = ln
(
Pri
1− Pri
)
= αi + β1Gt + β2∆Ot + β3(Gt ×∆Ot), (4)
where Gt is government spending and ∆Ot represents the change in oil price. Notice that, both
Gt and Ot are the same across all cross-section units i. Hence, Gt and Ot can be interpreted as
observed common factors for all cross-section units. In constructing the interaction terms, as
recommended by Wooldridge (2002, pp. 194-96), we de-mean both Gt and ∆Ot.
Before presenting the empirical results, it is important to determine which fiscal indica-
tor(s) to use as proxy for the government’s fiscal stance. With oil revenue accounting for over
three-quarters of total government revenue in GCC countries (see Table 1), conventional fiscal
indicators such as overall and primary balances are not sufficient to make a full assessment of
the short-term fiscal stance or longer-term fiscal sustainability (see Barnett and Ossowski (2002)
and Medas and Zakharova (2009)). This is because, when oil prices are rising, for example, an
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oil-producing country may be running higher overall surpluses in spite of increasing expenditure
financed by higher oil revenues. Therefore, an assessment of the underlying fiscal policy stance
on the basis of the overall balance could be misleading. For this reason, other indicators such
as non-oil balance are needed to guide fiscal policy in oil-producing countries.
We consider two alternative non-oil fiscal indicators to measure government fiscal stances in
GCC countries. Our first non-oil fiscal indicator is the ratio of non-oil primary balance (NOPB)
to non-oil GDP, which is considered as a key element in gauging the direction of fiscal policy in
oil-producing countries. Following Barnett and Ossowski (2002), the non-oil primary balance
is calculated by subtracting the non-oil revenue from total government expenditure. Thus an
increase in the non-oil primary balance would indicate an expansionary fiscal policy affected
either by higher expenditure or a reduction in non-oil revenue collection. Likewise a reduction
in the non-oil primary deficit would signal fiscal consolidation (see Medas and Zakharova, 2009).
Our second indicator uses a broader definition, fiscal impulse, which is traditionally used
to gauge the changing impact of the budget on the economy.31 The fiscal impulse thus focuses
whether budgets are moving towards expansion or contraction, rather than analyzing the actual
effects of the budget. The first step in calculating the fiscal impulse is to measure the cyclically-
adjusted non-oil balance (CANOB), which excludes the effect of automatic stabilizers and other
nondiscretionary factors on the non-oil balance, and therefore allows to reveal the portion of
the fiscal balance that is directly affected by discretionary fiscal policies (Medas and Zakharova,
2009). Following Husain et al. (2008), CANOB is calculated as:
CANOBt = rt − gt × Y
NO
t
Y ∗,NOt
,
where rt is the non-oil revenue to non-oil GDP ratio in period t, gt is the primary expenditure
to non-oil GDP ratio in period t, and Y NO/Y ∗,NO is real non-oil output divided by potential
(trend) output in period t. The potential non-output was obtained by applying the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. The fiscal impulse It is then defined as:
It = −∆CANOBt,
where a positive (negative) value of It indicates an expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy.
Figure 7 shows the behavior of fiscal policy, as measured by the fiscal impulse from non-oil
31For a comprehensive review of fiscal impulse analysis, see Heller et al. (1986) and Chand (1992).
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output, in the GCC countries. Over the 1981-2006 period, a common time period for all three
countries, the mean fiscal impulse measure indicates a fiscal contraction in Qatar and Saudi
Arabia and a fiscal expansion in Kuwait. For example, the average size of the fiscal contraction
during this period is 3.63 percent of non-oil GDP in Qatar and 0.30 percent of non-oil GDP
in Saudi Arabia, while the average size of fiscal expansion is 5.20 percent of non-oil GDP in
Kuwait during the same time.
Table 3: Determinants of business cycle synchronization: Panel logit estimation
Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia
NOPBt -0.491 0.195 0.851
(0.344) (0.669) (0.790)
∆Oilt 0.022 0.008 0.053∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
NOPBt ×∆Oilt -0.024 -0.094 0.367∗∗
(0.068) (0.159) (0.169)
It -0.129 -0.185 1.933∗∗
(0.468) (1.185) (0.913)
∆Oilt 0.018 0.006 -0.485e-03
(0.022) (0.020) (0.009)
It ×∆Oilt -0.042 0.101 0.555∗∗
(0.048) (0.231) (0.263)
i 8 8 9
N 232 208 351
Sample 1979-2007 1981-2006 1970-2008
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. The reported
standard errors are based on 1000 bootstrap replications. NOPBt,
It and Oilt refer to non-oil primary balance, fiscal impulse and oil
price, respectively. i is number of cross-section units (economic sec-
tors) and N is number of sample observations. ∗∗ denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level.
Equation 4 is estimated using the panel logit technique. Due to the small sample size, the
regression standard errors are computed using 1000 bootstrap replications. Standard errors
are clustered at the sector level to account for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of error
(Peterson, 2009); however this procedure does not permit dependence across cross-section or
clusters of observations.
The top panel in Table 3 shows the estimation results when the fiscal stance is measured
by the non-oil primary balance to non-oil GDP ratio, NOPBt. For Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
the synchronization indicator between the oil and the non-oil sectors is partly explained by
expansionary fiscal policy, while for Kuwait the negative coefficient for NOPBt signals fiscal
consolidation. However, these effects are far from being statistically significant. Changes in
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oil price, either directly or via the interaction term do not significantly explain the cycle syn-
chronization for Kuwait and Qatar. In contrast, changes in oil prices appear to significantly
explain the business cycle synchronization indicator in Saudi Arabia both directly and through
the interaction with fiscal variable. These positive and statistically significant coefficients sig-
nal a stronger distribution -and development-related considerations stemming from oil revenue
particularly when oil prices are high and rising.
By comparison, when the government’s fiscal stance is measured by the fiscal impulse, the
results appear to be quite different – see the lower panel in Table 3. For Saudi Arabia, a tighter
fiscal policy is associated with a larger synchronization, the coefficient is significant at the 5%
level. Whereas, fiscal impulse does not exert any significant impact on the synchronization
indicator in Kuwait and Qatar. Although oil prices do not wield any independent impact,
changes in oil prices through with fiscal impulse significantly affect the synchronization indicator
in Saudi Arabia. By contrast, the results are less supportive for Kuwait and Qatar.
In summary, the two non-oil fiscal indicators do not provide enough favorable evidence in
explaining the cycle synchronicity between the oil and non-oil sector. One possible explanation
for the lack of empirical support could be due to neglected cross-section dependence which is
known to create size distortions. The regression specification may also suffer from misspecifi-
cation in terms of omitted variables not included in the model. Another possible explanation
is the intended use of the indicator. How meaningful are these indicators in assessing the
synchronicity? Or is it the purpose of these indicators to assess the sustainability and/or the
distortionary effects of adjustments of a budget stance? These issues are well worth future
research to investigate further.
6 Conclusions
For many years the six GCC countries have been pursuing economic diversification in order to
reduce their dependence on hydrocarbon (oil and gas) exports. Given the inherent volatility
in oil receipts and the exhaustibility of the oil reserve, substantial government expenditure has
been directed toward the expansion of the non-oil sectors, such as agriculture, heavy industries
and services (mainly banking and tourism), as well as rebuilding the GCC’s physical and social
infrastructure. These expenditure programs have lifted the level of economic development and
living standards enormously in past decades. Nevertheless, the GCC countries continue to rely
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quite heavily on oil largely because diversification policies were often not complemented with
required reform in private, financial and labor markets.
This paper provides a quantitative assessment of the economic diversification achieved so
far in the three GCC countries, namely Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. We show both
the degree of diversification achieved so far and the direction of diversification in terms of
individual non-oil sectors. Overall, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia appear to be moderately ahead
in comparison with Qatar in reducing their dependence on oil. Notwithstanding, by developing
large production capacities of natural gas, Qatar has recently reduced its dependence on oil in
favor of natural gas. We also conducted an empirical assessment of the determinants of business
cycle synchronization between oil and non-oil sector. We find that the fiscal stance and oil price
variables significantly explain the business cycle synchronization between the oil and the non-oil
sectors in Saudi Arabia. The results, however, are less supportive for Kuwait and Qatar.
Over the longer horizon, GCC’s efforts to meaningful economic diversification are likely to be
challenged from several fronts. First, similarities in the development of non-oil sectors may lead
to excess supply and therefore underutilization of productive resources. Second, GCC’s passion
for large investments in real estate and construction sectors may contribute little to diversifying
the productive base of the economy or upgrading labor skills. Likewise, promoting higher
education is unlikely to provide the required skills unless there is adequate reform in primary
and secondary education. Finally, full diversification many be politically costly. Diversification
may gradually lead to a societal power base outside the control of ruling political elites, that
may challenge state incumbents particularly during times of economic downturns (Dunning,
2005).
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Figure 1: Synchronicity of Kuwait’s non-oil GDP vis-a`-vis its oil GDP
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Note: Time period is 1978-2007. The synchronicity is calculated
using equation (2) in the text; it lies between -1 and +1. Trend
denotes the long-run trend of the synchronicity measure extracted
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The non-oil GDP is defined as the
sum of all sectoral GDP listed in Table 1 plus utilities (electricity,
gas, & water) and import duty and less imputed bank service charge.
24
Figure 2: Synchronicity of Qatar’s non-oil GDP vis-a`-vis its oil GDP
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Note: Time period is 1980-2006. The synchronicity is calculated
using equation (2) in the text; it lies between -1 and +1. Trend
denotes the long-run trend of the synchronicity measure extracted
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The non-oil GDP is defined as the
sum of all sectoral GDP listed in Table 1 plus utilities (electricity,
gas, & water) and import duty and less imputed bank service charge.
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Figure 3: Synchronicity of Saudi Arabia’s non-oil GDP vis-a`-vis its oil GDP
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Note: Time period is 1968-2008. The synchronicity is calculated
using equation (2) in the text; it lies between -1 and +1. Trend
denotes the long-run trend of the synchronicity measure extracted
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The non-oil GDP is defined as the
sum of all sectoral GDP listed in Table 1 plus utilities (electricity,
gas, & water) and import duty and less imputed bank service charge.
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Figure 4: Synchronicity by sector: Kuwait
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Note: Time period is 1978-2007. The synchronicity is calculated using equation (1) in the text; it lies
between -1 and +1. Trend denotes the long-run trend of the synchronicity measure extracted using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. See Table 1 for the list of economic sectors.
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Figure 5: Synchronicity by sector: Qatar
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Note: Time period is 1980-2006. The synchronicity is calculated using equation (1) in the text; it lies
between -1 and +1. Trend denotes the long-run trend of the synchronicity measure extracted using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. See Table 1 for the list of economic sectors.
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Figure 6: Synchronicity by sector: Saudi Arabia
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Note: Time period is 1968-2008. The synchronicity is calculated using equation (1) in the text; it lies
between -1 and +1. Trend denotes the long-run trend of the synchronicity measure extracted using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter. See Table 1 for the list of economic sectors.
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Figure 7: Structural fiscal impulse in GCC countries
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Note: A positive (negative) value of impulse indicates an expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy.
Time period: 1979-2007 (Kuwait); 1981-2006 (Qatar); 1970-2008 (Saudi Arabia).
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